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Conventional global justice theory expresses a concern for the suffering of individuals around 
the world, yet very often the experience of those individuals plays little role in the work of 
theorising global justice. In this paper I argue that global justice has tended to take an 
architectonic approach in which the theorist orders the world by offering idealised principles 
of justice that serve as guides to necessary global reforms. This approach draws on a flawed 
geography of injustice, in which the world is divided into just and order regions that must save 
unjust and disordered regions, while also misunderstanding the causes of injustice. In place of 
this architectonic approach, I offer a consummatory approach that conceives of justice as a 
quality of social relationships and which draws on the experience of individuals suffering 
injustice, using the Grenfell Tower fire as an example. This consummatory approach is then 
















































“Residents of the area call it the crematorium. 
It has revealed the undercurrents of our age. 
The poor who thought voting for the rich would save them. 
The poor who believed all that the papers said. 
The poor who listened with their fears. 
The poor who live in their rooms and dream for their kids. 
The poor are you and I, you in your garden of flowers, 
In your house of books, who gaze from afar 
At a destiny that draws near with another name. 
Sometimes it takes an image to wake up a nation 
From its secret shame. And here it is every name 
Of someone burnt to death, on the stairs or in their room, 
Who had no idea what they died for, or how they were betrayed. 
They did not die when they died; their deaths happened long 
Before. It happened in the minds of people who never saw 
Them. It happened in the profit margins. It happened 
In the laws. They died because money could be saved and made.” 
 






1. “Where there is fire, there is politics.”1 
 
Just before 1AM on 14 June 2017, a faulty fridge-freezer caught fire in the kitchen of a flat 
in the Grenfell Tower in West London. The fire spread through the building despite the efforts 
of the fire brigade. While many residents managed to escape, at least seventy-two people died 
and the survivors continue to suffer as the response to their needs by authorities has been 
inadequate.2 The fire in the tower spread quickly because of conditions in the building. Inside, 
the many faults and hazards ignored by the management company allowed the blaze to grow 
unchecked and impeded residents’ escape. Outside, the cosmetic cladding—added to appease 
wealthy neighbours who thought Grenfell was an “eyesore”—allowed the fire to circumvent 
existing protections and engulf the entire structure. While the tower was neglected and 
dangerous, residents were aware of the problems and had appealed to the management 
                                               
1 Faku quoted in Kerry Ryan Chance, “‘Where There Is Fire, There Is Politics’: Ungovernability and Material 
Life in Urban South Africa,” Cultural Anthropology 30, no. 3 (August 10, 2015): 394. 
2 Natasha Elcock, “I Escaped from the Grenfell Tower Fire – but Now We Face a New Trauma | Natasha 
Elcock,” the Guardian, December 27, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/27/grenfell-
tower-new-trauma-theresa-may-panel-inquiry-justice. 
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company and the government for help long before the fire started.3 Yet, the residents—poor, 
often vulnerable and socially marginalised—were ignored. It is clear social housing and its 
residents were not a priority in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Under the guise 
of “austerity”, government agencies reduced oversight and funding, leaving residents 
vulnerable to fire and other hazards. Claiming to “redevelop” the site, the management 
company created the combustible conditions that fed the fire: flammable cladding, inadequate 
exits, incorrect safety advice, and an overcrowded site that made it difficult for fire crews to 
access the building.  
The Grenfell Tower fire is a tragedy, which is a facile platitude. The events of that night 
were the culmination of a long and complex series of interactions between a number of different 
people and institutions. It is an injustice that dozens were killed and hundreds had their homes 
destroyed. However, understanding the fire as a moral wrong is challenging. The resident 
whose fridge-freezer malfunctioned did not intend to set the tower on fire. Neither the 
building’s management company nor the government wanted to burn the tower, destroy homes, 
or kill people. There is no evil villain or conspiracy to which we can assign blame. Yet, what 
happened was more than an accident; human actions led to the mistreatment of the residents of 
Grenfell Tower. As Ben Okri writes, “their deaths happened long before. It happened in the 
minds of people who never saw them. It happened in the profit margins. It happened in the 
laws.”4 To understand the Grenfell Tower fire we must see it is a wrong that is the consequence 
of wider and highly unequal relationships, mediated through hierarchical social practices and 
institutions with global scope, in particular unequal relationships of class, race, gender, and 
national identity.  
 The injustice of the Grenfell Tower fire is not unique; similar injustices occur across 
the globe. For example, in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, which includes the city 
of Durban, in South Africa, shack fires in informal settlements have killed hundreds of people 
and destroyed thousands of homes.5 Ten years prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, on 1 November 
2007, a fire broke out in the Kennedy Road settlement. The fire started in the home of Ma 
Khuzwayo, a 52-year-old woman living with her 12 children and grandchildren. Residents of 
the settlement were able to extinguish the fire before it spread, but not before it killed Ma 
Khuzwayo, who was unable to flee her shack because her mobility was limited as an amputee.6 
This fire, and many like it at Kennedy Road and other settlements across South Africa, started 
because residents rely on gas stoves and candles for heat, cooking, and light. The lack of basic 
utilities makes everyday life an often-deadly affair, especial for those like Ma Khuzwayo facing 
multiple cross-cutting vulnerabilities and exclusions.  
As the residents affected by these fires have sought to make clear, fires are not random 
events or natural disasters, but rather political consequences of social action and inaction, 
especially by authorities—from the municipal to the global levels. In the case of the shack fires 
in eThekwini, a variety of social forces press the poorest residents to live in informal urban 
settlements. These people are treated as a hazard rather than citizens deserving services, 
protection, and rights of participation. Residents use open flames because local authorities 
refuse to provide electricity to the settlements, and in fact removed electrical connections 
starting in 2001. Authorities are driven not only by a desire to dissuade informal settlements, 
                                               
3 Grenfell Action Group, “KCTMO – Playing with Fire!,” Grenfell Action Group (blog), November 20, 2016, 
https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2016/11/20/kctmo-playing-with-fire/.  
4 “Grenfell Tower, June, 2017: A Poem by Ben Okri,” Financial Times, June 23, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/39022f72-5742-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2. 
5 Matt Birkinshaw, “A Big Devil in the Shacks: The Politics of Fire,” Pambazuka News, September 17, 2008, 
https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/big-devil-shacks. 
6 Abahlali BaseMjondolo, “The Plague of Fires Takes Another Life in Kennedy Road,” Abahlali BaseMjondolo, 
November 1, 2007, http://abahlali.org/node/2822/. 
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but also by a global effort to privatise public services—in London as well as Durban.7 When 
fires do occur, they are particularly devastating as shacks are built closely together and 
settlements densely populated, again because governments refuse to meet the shack dwellers 
demands for adequate land and housing. Further, lack of access for emergency services and 
inadequate water supplies mean extinguishing fires is often difficult or impossible. This 
dynamic has causes beyond local and national politics, as global patterns of urban development 
prioritise investment that benefits private interests rather than the public good.8 Yet, the 
injustice does not stop at neglect: the residents in informal settlements face harassment, 
violence, and the destruction of their homes, as authorities in eThekwini, and other 
municipalities, are trying to remove shack dwellers from the city to resettlement areas far from 
their homes and families, as well as economic and social opportunities. The increasing violence 
of urban policing is, again, not unique to South Africa but rather reflects a wider 
securitisation—and in fact militarisation—of the city.9 
These two images of injustice, at Grenfell and Kennedy Road, different but so alike, 
can help us to rethink the nature of global justice. In both these cases, fire has a distinctive 
symbolic meaning. Fire has long represented the power of authorities, as the individuals and 
institutions in charge of society are imbued with a unique force that enables them to rule while 
also making them responsible for restraining their power and protecting the community.10 In 
both Durban and London we see the power of government misused, with failure physically 
manifested in fires that grow out of control and consume the homes and lives of those most 
profoundly disempowered by the social order.  
Fire as a symbol of power, however, also represents the power that comes from the 
community itself, in particular from the marginalised and disempowered refusing their place 
in society, with metaphorical fire consuming old institutions. From the fires of the London 
Riots in 2011,11 to the those set at Kennedy Road in 2005 to hold off the destruction of homes 
with a barricade of burning tires and mattresses,12 the power in the flames is not only that of 
authority—it is also the force of those who refuse to submit to an unjust social order. Attending 
to the duality of fire as a political symbol draws out the first lesson to be learned from the 
injustices at Grenfell Tower and Kennedy Road: justice is always political. I do not mean that 
injustices are committed only by political figures or government institutions, though they often 
are. Rather, the terms in which we conventionally understand both what justice demands and 
which harms count as injustices reflect the experience of privileged groups that dominate social 
institutions and are shaped by the play of political power in society. Justice, then, in its 
everyday sense, reflects the existing arrangement of society, with its attendant inequalities of 
power and privilege. There is, of course, another understanding of justice as a critical claim 
against conventional standards, but this normative understanding is still situated within politics, 
as critical justice-claims reflect particular social positions.13 This situatedness is often a cause 
of concern, with many theorists of justice struggling to expunge partiality from the principles 
                                               
7 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), chap. 4. 
8 David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2013), chap. 
2. 
9 Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: Verso, 2010). 
10 Charteris-Black (2016) and Chance (2015) 
11 Meera Sabaratnam and Joe Hoover, “Reading Violence: What’s Political about the London Riots(?),” The 
Disorder Of Things (blog), August 9, 2011, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2011/08/09/reading-violence-whats-
political/. 
12 Nigel C Gibson, “Zabalaza, Unfinished Struggles against Apartheid: The Shackdwellers’ Movement in 
Durban,” Socialism and Democracy 21, no. 3 (2007): 60–96. 
13 Michael Goodhart, Injustice: Political Theory for the Real World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), chaps. 1 & 2. Goodhart demonstrates the tendency of conventional justice theory to obscure the 
politics at stake.  
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they offer. My contention is that this situatedness cannot and should not be denied. Instead, I 
argue we should acknowledge the political quality of the demands made in the name of justice 
in order to ensure our theories of global justice attend to their own political commitments and 
perspectives. As justice seeks to realise particular moral ends it will always entail a 
transformation of the social order and the redistribution of political power. 
  Fire has a second symbolic meaning at both Grenfell Tower and Kennedy Road, as it 
draws out the processual character of injustice; like fire, injustice is not a discrete act or event, 
it is a relationship between elements that leads to a reaction. Injustices are the consequences of 
actions taken within wider social arrangements, which means that even decisions that are not 
intentionally unjust or harmful can lead to injustice because individuals are connected through 
increasingly complex and wide-ranging social practices—Iris Marion Young called this a 
social connection model.14 Thus, the second lesson we can learn from these terrible fires is that 
injustice is a consequence of ongoing and complex social connections, therefore justice must 
aspire to a rearrangement of our social connections, which is a work that is always responsive, 
ongoing, and contingent. Justice is a quality of lived and shared experiences rather than a 
harmonious order to be constructed or an end state to be reached.  
 How, then, do these specific examples and proposed lessons change global justice 
theory? My contention is that they reveal the limits of contemporary global justice theory, 
which tends to obscure the power relations that shape such theorising and misrepresents the 
injustices it seeks to remedy. Further, it misconstrues what the pursuit of justice entails by 
thinking of justice as a depoliticised end-state or ideal arrangement of the social world. The 
fires in London and Durban require us to think about global justice as a quality of the active 
and lived relationships between people. I develop an alternative approach to justice in what 
follows by distinguishing between architectonic and consummatory approaches. The 
architectonic approach conceptualises justice as being concerned with justifying principles that 
order individual and institutional actors, offering a blueprint for the social world. By contrast, 
a consummatory approach frames justice as an emergent quality of social relationships, and for 
this reason is concerned with the distribution of power within social relationships, as well as in 
the institutions and practices that structure those relationships. A consummatory approach 
entails both an affirmation of the lived experience of those suffering injustice, as well as a 
critique of the power-relationships through which those experiences are constructed.15 In the 
end, I offer an initial outline of how this consummatory approach might be developed into a 
situationist global justice theory.16  
 
2. Architectonic Visions of Justice  
 
Since Plato’s Republic, ideas about justice have been expressed through metaphors of 
sight and vision.17 In his famous myth of the cave, Plato suggests that the insight needed to 
understand justice requires removing oneself from everyday experience and striving to see the 
true nature of the world, accessible only to those with the proper capacities and training. While 
Plato’s elitism offends contemporary egalitarian sensibilities, the basic problem he addresses 
remain familiar: we need some way of knowing if the social rules we follow are truly good, 
                                               
14 Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 102–30. 
15 See further, Pol Bargués-Pedreny & Peter Finkenbusch, “From Critique to Affirmation in International 
Relations,” Global Society, 33, no. 1 (2019).  
16 For an approach to such questions that is situationist in different but resonate terms, see Doerthe Rosenow, 
“Decolonising the decolonisers? Or why we should strive for not knowing in the GMO controversy,” Global 
Society, 33, no. 1 (2019). 
17 Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, 3rd edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2007). 
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and who can be trusted with the power to determine those rules. Few today would be inclined 
to appoint philosopher kings, but justice theorising often remains wedded to Plato’s framing. 
The theorist of justice is presented as an impartial observer, able to identify injustices invisible 
to others, and, because of their impartial perspective, especially able to suggest principles of 
justice. Determining the principles that should guide society requires the exercise of judgment, 
therefore, the conventional mode of justice theorising is stubbornly architectonic, as the theorist 
is presumed to possess a privileged form of insight and to be capable of a unique impartiality. 
Their impartial perspective enables the justice theorist to order the social world properly, as an 
architect designs a building.  
In conventional approaches the global justice theorist purports to show us something of 
our world we have failed to see: hidden, or at least unacknowledged, injustices. Further, by 
offering principles of global justice, the theorist, like Plato, orders the world according to 
impartial moral standards imbued with transcendent authority.18 Kimberly Hutchings shows 
how the theorist’s privileged capacity of judgment is justified, first, by  her timeliness, as she 
is located at the forefront of a global and distinctly modern progressive temporality, such that 
those who deny the authority of the universal and impartial principles that the theorist 
articulates, are conceptually exiled to an irrational past.19 Second, the theorist’s judgments are 
rendered with a certainty that denies the possibility of vulnerability, for the theorist or her 
judgment.20 In what follows, I highlight how this architectonic approach moralises the politics 
of its own prescriptions, obscuring the power relationships at play while also misconstruing 
the nature of global injustices in such a way that the prescriptions offered are inadequate. 
Importantly, I am not claiming that individuals who theorise about global justice are choosing 
to take on this perspective, but rather that the architectonic approach frames and limits global 
justice theory, from early work in the 1970s to today. 
Peter Singer’s influential 1972 article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” presents one 
of the clearest examples of the architectonic approach.21 Singer begins with what he calls the 
“essential facts” of the humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh in 1971, describing it as a situation 
in which 9 million refugees faced death due to a lack of food, shelter, and medical care. The 
crisis, he claims, was avoidable and caused by a combination of persistent poverty, natural 
disaster, and civil war.22 This description will likely seem inadequate to anyone with a passing 
knowledge of the 1971 war in what was then East Pakistan, as Pakistani forces targeted Bengali 
nationalists, committing genocidal violence, and sparked a civil war, in which India intervened 
due to the enormous human suffering that followed.23 Singer, however, is clear that the details 
of the case are not important to his central concern, which is the inadequacy of the response by 
people in “affluent countries” to profound human suffering happening in far-away places.24 
The suffering of Bengalis in 1971 is only an illustrative example of a general problem. 
Singer’s central goal is to alter the moral thinking, and therefore the practical actions, of people 
in affluent countries by showing them their unacknowledged responsibilities to relieve human 
suffering. It is because Singer is interested in providing a general ordering of the world that he 
                                               
18 Kimberly Hutchings, “Thinking Ethically about the Global in ‘Global Ethics,’” Journal of Global Ethics 10, 
no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 26–29. 
19 Kimberly Hutchings, “What Is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness in 
Cosmopolitical Thought,” Constellations 18, no. 2 (2011): 190–204. 
20 Kimberly Hutchings, “A Place of Greater Safety? Securing Judgment in International Ethics,” in The 
Vulnerable Subject: Beyond Rationalism in International Relations, ed. Amanda Russell Beattie and Kate 
Schick (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 25–42. 
21 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–43. 
22 Singer, 229–30. 
23 David Bergman, “The Politics of Bangladesh’s Genocide Debate,” The New York Times, April 5, 2016, sec. 
Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/opinion/the-politics-of-bangladeshs-genocide-debate.html. 
24 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 230–33. 
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is able to move from pressing political events in Bangladesh to a hypothetical drowning child 
by way of a scarcely acknowledged analogy. In order to show that the distance that separates 
individuals in affluent countries from the people suffering in Bangladesh is morally irrelevant, 
he asks his reader to imagine a child drowning in a shallow pond, and then to reflect on their 
obligation to save the child, given the small cost to themselves. He then argues the obligation 
to alleviate or prevent suffering is not altered by the greater distance between his reader and 
those suffering in Bangladesh. The implication of this argument is that his readers’ moral 
relationship to the refugees in Bangladesh is the same as their relationship to the child they 
imagine drowning, and, thus, individuals in affluent countries ought to act to for the same 
reasons. 
Singer invites us to imagine global injustice as a matter of persistent suffering, in 
particular of those who are weak, which the powerful have an obligation to alleviate. His stark 
rendering of global injustice allows us to identify the problematic political relationships such 
a framing of injustice presumes. First, the suffering of the weak is unrelated to the capacities 
of the strong, who are able to alleviate their suffering. Therefore, the task of justice is to 
motivate action, rather than reforming the interactions between the weak and the powerful or 
considering the underlying social structures the produce weak and powerful people. Second, 
the powerful are called upon to respond to global injustice as a matter of conscience, not as a 
result of any particular complicity in the suffering of distant others. The moral relationship 
between the weak and the powerful is a universal relationship defined by duty, in which the 
powerful must save the weak. Viewing injustice in this manner removes questions about the 
type of relationship between individuals. How and why the affluent have such wealth and 
power, or how those suffering came to suffer, is not particularly important and no consideration 
is given to how we might avoid the reproduction of political hierarchies in our moral theory. 
To put perhaps too fine a point on it: the Bengalis killed, raped, injured, starved, and displaced 
in the war in 1971 were not imagined children drowning in a pond. They were real persons 
caught up in dramatic political events and positioned within global social structures that 
increased their vulnerability to harms; they had their own strategies for survival, thoughts on 
the injustice of their situation, and were still able to speak and act on their own behalf. Their 
agency, obscured in Singer’s framing, does not mean they were not in need of assistance, but 
it should give us pause before thinking of them as anonymous and helpless people in need of 
saving by the citizens of affluent countries.  
The politics of dependency inherent in the architectonic approach, while particularly 
clear in Singer’s work, is seen in much of the global justice literature.25 There is profound 
suffering of great numbers of abject individuals somewhere “out there”, whom people in the 
secure, stable, and wealthy world, “here” at home, must be motivated to address. On this 
framing, injustices arise in the disordered, dangerous, and poor world outside “our” experience. 
Singer’s argument so clearly reveals the politics of dependency in conventional approaches to 
global justice because he simplifies the world so profoundly. Less simplistic accounts of global 
justice render the politics of dependence in more subtle hues, yet I argue the architectonic 
approach persists.   
In 1975, Charles Beitz expanded John Rawls’ theory of justice to include questions of 
global justice.26 Like Singer, Beitz frames global justice in terms of what those in wealthy 
                                               
25 Charles Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 374–77; 
Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14, 443–44; Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: 
Capabilities and Global Justice,” Oxford Development Studies 32, no. 1 (2004): 3–4; Thomas Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 2–5, 103–6. 
26 Beitz, “Justice and International Relations”; See also Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International 
Relations (Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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states owe those in poor states, but he criticises Singer’s failure to distinguish between moral 
duties that are a matter of humanity and those that are a matter of justice.27 For Beitz, the 
demands of justice are determined by the way in which citizens create legitimate state 
institutions. Justice requires that the basic structure of society ensures equality between 
individuals. Therefore, the question of justice goes beyond whether individuals are moved by 
the suffering of other individuals, and instead addresses the rightfulness of the institutional 
order they create and in which they participate. The terms of justice are set through an idealised 
moral contract between citizens, securing protections and mutual advantage within the nation-
state. Global justice, then, is only a concern if the ideal state is not self-sufficient and 
autonomous. Beitz argues the nation-state is not self-sufficient and, therefore, we must also 
consider what obligations of justice exist between states as the international order affects the 
rights and life chances of individuals.  
Beitz appeals to the changed conditions of a globalising world to motivate reform of 
the international order, which he argues is unjustly committed to the supremacy of state 
sovereignty. He argues that the interdependence of nation-states has reached a level of intensity 
that requires a rewriting of the social contract to include relations between nation-states. The 
nation-state alone cannot protect the rights of individuals or ensure mutual prosperity because 
(a) of its tendency to appeal to sovereignty as a justification for the abuses committed against 
citizens; (b) the inability of nation-states to determine their own economic destinies, especially 
given the unequal distribution of natural resources and advantages; and (c) the way the 
international orders fails to help poor countries and instead ends up harming them, as 
international institutions serve and magnify the self-interest of powerful states at the expense 
of weaker ones. Beitz’s idealised contractual framing renders global injustices as either the 
result of faulty nation-states (in which improperly constituted social contracts lead to injustice) 
or an improper ordering of the international sphere (such that the international order allows for 
exploitative behaviour by powerful states and international institutions). Global justice then 
demands that sovereignty is conditional upon the protection of international human rights and 
the global redistribution of wealth. Both of these demands require powerful and wealthy 
nations to act more justly, which depends upon changing the international order so that the self-
interests of powerful states are not pulled in competing directions.  
Beitz’s account of global justice is less stark than Singer’s, but it is still shaped by a 
politics of dependence. The general understanding of injustice common to the architectonic 
approach is premised on the separation of geographic spaces of justice and injustice—a “here” 
that is just and a “there” that is unjust. The unjust spaces out “there” in the world are defined 
by the failure of political and economic institutions. Whether the injustices of concern are rights 
violations or profound poverty, the core problem is that these unjust spaces are not able to 
properly order themselves. The disordered spaces of the globe suffer governments that are 
abusive, incompetent, or corrupt, as well as poor economies that suffer ineffective institutions 
and laws, lack resources, and face exposure to natural disasters. Understanding the problem in 
this way structures the debate that follows, as the central concern is to demonstrate why and 
how individuals living in the orderly spaces of the world should go about fixing the disorderly 
spaces, to save those unfortunate individuals suffering from global disorder. While Singer 
presents this politics of dependence in highly simplified terms—poor people are suffering and 
rich people have a duty to help—the architectonic approach does not preclude the possibility 
of finding institutions in the ordered world complicit in injustice in disordered spaces. Beitz 
attempts to show that global poverty has its causes in the harms the powerful commit against 
the weak by venerating the principle of state sovereignty. Yet, these attempts to think in terms 
of complicity render that complicity as an aberration within ordered spaces, a moral failure to 
                                               
27 Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” 360–62. 
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be corrected by properly extending the social contract. Extending the social contract globally 
is meant to clarify the obligations of justice that exist beyond the nation-state and limit the 
institutional expression of state-interests that are contrary to the demands of justice.  
This flawed geography of injustice limits the political imagination of most global 
justice theorising to a statist one, as the ideal form of political order looks like a stable, liberal 
state, presumably filled with affluent citizens, even if that state needs integration into a more 
global institutional order.28 While earlier debates highlighted a division between cosmopolitan 
and statist approaches,29 as the global justice literature has developed it is clear that 
cosmopolitan reforms primarily serve to expand the political order captured by the idea of the 
good liberal nation-state.30 This can be seen in recent literature in which disagreements over 
the exact obligations of global justice that states have focuses on narrow differences over 
whether the legitimacy of the modern state is best perfected by formalising norms of  assistance 
or working towards more encompassing cosmopolitan institutions.31 The idealisation of the 
liberal nation-state hinders our understanding of the institutional conditions of injustice, as the 
focus is on which institutions are proper to the ordering of the world rather than the nature of 
social relationships and the distribution of power within and across geographic spaces. The 
tendency to work towards ideal political orders leaves us with seemingly irresolvable problems, 
as the self-sufficient nation-state is a myth now (if it ever was a reality) and the various 
proposed cosmopolitan orders seem caught between an unlikely (and probably undesirable) 
world state, and an ineffective (if more likely) reform of the existing international system. In 
either case the terrain for justice theorising seems to be a non-place, a utopian political 
geography seeking a return to the lost world of the sovereign nation-state or setting out in 
search of an as yet unseen global polity.32 
Following on from the flawed geography of injustice and idealisation of the good liberal 
nation-state, the architectonic approach leads us to misunderstand the causes of global injustice. 
First, by understanding injustice as the breakdown of an idealised order, the architectonic 
approach uncritically presumes order itself is a condition of justice. In Beitz’s work this 
presumption goes further, as a just order is one that has the character of a contract individuals 
freely and rationally agree to in order to further their interests. This makes it impossible to see 
the way social orders that produce abuse, poverty, inequality, and other injustices are often 
                                               
28 The retreat to an ideal and ordered world is indicative of a latent nihilism in much justice theory. See further, 
Gideon Baker, “Critique, Use and World in Giorgio Agamben’s Genealogy of Government,” Global Society, 
33, no. 1 (2019). 
29 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Thomas 
Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 113–147; Richard 
Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
30 Jürgen Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society,” Constellations 15, no. 4 (2008): 444–455; P. Lawler, “The Good State: In 
Praise of ‘Classical’Internationalism,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 03 (2005): 427–449; John Rawls, 
The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (OUP Oxford, 2012). 
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working as expected.33 The architectonic approach fails to engage with the social construction 
of injustice as it cannot see how social orders actively produce individuals that are encouraged 
to take advantage of inequality, especially when that exploitation is carried out within formal 
rules of legal reciprocity. Disorder in some spaces is the precondition of order in others. The 
latent colonial attitude of the architectonic approach is especially clear here, as it precludes the 
possibility that suffering is the intended product of an international order built on a previous 
imperial order, which would make the division of the world into distinctly just and unjust 
spaces untenable.  
Second, the conventional account of global injustice considers the state’s tendency to 
pursue its irrational and immoral self-interest, as the central problem—because it either leads 
individuals to an unjust partiality or the state itself commits unjust actions. Therefore, justice 
requires institutional reforms that can ensure the rational and moral behaviour of states within 
an order that makes their obligations to other states clear. There are, however, considerable 
reasons to doubt that nation-states are moral actors that can recognise or act upon their rational 
moral duties in the manner required.34 In addition, the architectonic approach obscures how the 
structure of the state and international order itself is the cause of injustices. For example, the 
exclusivity of membership in the nation-state leaves millions suffering in unsafe places around 
the globe, and the extension of production processes globally enables the exploitation of 
workers and natural resources in poor countries. Even where Beitz, for example, addresses the 
problems with the international order, his solution is to redistribute resources and wealth from 
wealthy states to poor states through international institutions that more effectively curtail 
state-interest, rather that addressing the deeper problems, such as the fundamentally arbitrary 
nature of national distinctions between members and non-members, or the unequal distribution 
of the benefits of global production and trade.  
Lest we think these short comings are a result of the time-period in which Singer and 
Beitz were first writing, or their broadly-liberal approach, there is a striking persistence of the 
architectonic approach, which can be seen in the more recent work of Rainer Forst and Nancy 
Fraser. Initially, Forst’s theorisation of justice seems to promise an alternative, as he argues 
justice is fundamentally concerned with relationships between human beings, and especially 
with preventing domination.35 The first question of justice then becomes the justifiability of 
the distribution of power in social relationships, as well as the degree to which social structures 
uphold the right to justification, which is the right to be recognised as a subject owed, and able 
to offer, reasonable justifications. Forst, then, sets out to provide an overarching standard to 
guide political deliberations and institutional arrangements, rather than a universal principle, 
meaning that the specific principles, norms, and laws of a just society will vary depending on 
their unique conditions. Thus, global justice becomes a matter of emancipating individuals 
from domination, whether interpersonal or institutional. For Forst, global justice requires the 
remaking of human rights as demands for the recognition of every individual as an active 
subject in political and social life,36 which in turn necessitates domestic and international 
institutions that ensure a right to democratic participation sufficient for individuals to have a 
say in the distribution of wealth and resources. 
                                               
33 Carole Pateman and Charles Mills, The Contract and Domination (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 
2007). 
34 Toni Erskine, ed., Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International 
Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
35 Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 24; 
Also see Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
36 Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, 38–70. 
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 Forst’s relational theory of justice rejects the politics of dependence. Further, his 
understanding of justice as requiring a basic social structure that empowers each individual to 
demand, and consent to, reciprocal and general justifications goes beyond the limited 
contractarian account in Beitz. Yet, Forst’s rejection of the architectonic approach is 
incomplete as he remains committed to the utopian ideal of providing “a blueprint of a fully 
justified basic structure.”37 Such an ideal aims at eliminating domination, which Seyla 
Benhabib argues fails to account for the stubborn resistance of the social world to such a 
rational arrangement, while also delimiting the possibilities of what new forms and ideals of 
justice may yet be realised.38 Forst claims the political process of realising a transparent and 
fully justified basic structure accommodates diversity, but the ideal toward which those many 
different routes progress is one of completeness and closure. 
 Forst is unapologetic about his utopianism and defends it by suggesting that there is a 
double normativity in utopian thinking, as we both imagine an ideal world free from 
domination while retaining a general scepticism toward such plans.39 The idea is that we leave 
room for the novel and unexpected in human interactions, while aspiring to a fully justified 
basic structure. Forst’s faith in the power of scepticism to temper the excesses of utopianism, 
however, is undermined in his own reflections on global justice in The Right to Justification. 
Forst asks his readers to imagine themselves as a poor miner working under exploitative 
conditions in a mine somewhere in the world, presumably in the global south.40 The reader, 
imagining themselves as the miner, is invited to appear before an equally imaginary Global 
Court of Distributive Justice to make her case for what justice should be for poor exploited 
miners. The miner is given a choice of different attorneys, each representing a competing 
justice theory. In the end, the miner rejects all the attorneys in favour of a conception of justice 
that demands her inclusion as a subject of justification. Aside from simply reaffirming Forst’s 
own theory, this imagined trial has further limitations. As John McGuire argues, Forst’s 
idealised encounter shows the thinness of his commitment to grounding justice in social and 
political reality, as the experiences of actually-existing exploited miners are ignored, as are 
their thoughts about the injustice of their situation and the philosophical traditions they might 
actually draw upon.41 Instead, engagement with the experience of injustice is limited to the 
miner’s imagined internal dialogue in response to the various Western traditions embodied by 
the lawyers. It is telling that this is unimportant to Forst, as the scene reveals that while the 
miner may have something to learn from Forst, it appears Forst has nothing to learn from 
exploited miners. This myopia reconfirms Benhabib’s worry that Forst’s account of justice is 
more Platonic than he realises, as justice at his imagined court confirms the authority of his 
abstract vision rather than expanding our horizons. This reveals the first persistent seduction 
of the architectonic approach, it invites us to retain the privileged position of the theorist—as 
an educator who enables others to see the radiant vision of justice. Within Forst’s theory the 
role of architect is open to all, but it seems the principles of the architect’s craft are rather less 
open to fundamental revision.  
The privileges afforded the theorist directly contribute to a further problem with Forst’s 
account of global justice, as he maintains the problematic rendering of the geography of 
injustice. Forst seeks to consider the global context of injustice in a critical way, by looking at 
multiple forms of domination, and in doing so expands upon limited liberal approaches. Yet, 
                                               
37 Seyla Benhabib, “The Uses and Abuses of Kantian Rigorism. On Rainer Forst’s Moral and Political 
Philosophy,” Political Theory 43, no. 6 (2015): 789. 
38 Benhabib, 789. 
39 Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, 177–90. 
40 Forst, The Right to Justification, 241–50.  
41 John McGuire, “Two Rawls Don’t Make a Right: On Rainer Forst and the New Normativity,” Constellations 
23, no. 1 (2016): 110–21.  
 13 
the person he imagines to be dominated by the global system is a poor person in a poor country 
dominated by rich countries, subject to failing or illegitimate government at the national level 
and to undemocratic and often exploitative governance at the global level. Forst appeals to 
changed conditions that expose individuals to a variety of harmful global forces and is critical 
of the failings of state governments, yet the context of injustice remains idealised rather than 
concrete, such that the principles of justice intended to reform society remain separated from 
specific injustices. The primary context of justice and normal space for political engagement 
is presumed to the be the nation-state, therefore questions of justice are addressed first through 
participation in the bounded community of citizens. The global sphere is recognised as a 
context with consequences that effect individuals and contribute to injustices, hence the need 
for global justice norms, but the primary space in which justice is pursued remains the 
sovereign nation-state. Global injustice, however, is not so neat, and those suffering injustices 
as part of the global system are not only the poor and the poorly governed trapped in poor 
states, but in fact all of us effected by the declining democratic responsiveness of national 
governments, the increasing power of non-state authorities (particularly multinational 
corporations), and economic processes that are increasing inequality globally. Forst retains key 
aspects of the architectonic approach and thus struggles to understand global injustice, much 
less reimagine global justice, beyond the old tension between statist and cosmopolitan orders.42 
We are left wondering how to understand the geography of global injustice and how to  imagine 
a more just world without relying on idealised political orders. This reveals the second 
persistent seduction of the architectonic approach, it is easier to remain in the framing of 
national and cosmopolitan ideals than to think the geography of injustice differently.  
To explore this second issue more fully we can turn to Nancy Fraser’s work, in which 
she argues that the way we draw the boundaries that define the scope of justice is itself a subject 
of justice.43 Similar to Forst, Fraser’s account appeals to an underlying normative principle, for 
her it is participatory parity. This principle protects the moral equality of individuals by 
guaranteeing their political status and participation in decision making. Participatory parity is 
then applied in three different dimensions of justice, the distributive and redistributive 
dimensions are the focus of Fraser’s well-known early-writing,44 but in Frames of Justice she 
is primarily concerned with the third-dimension of justice, which is representation. All the 
dimensions of justice should be regulated by the norm of participatory parity but representation 
is of special importance in times of what she terms “abnormal justice.”45 The special 
importance of the representative dimension arises because there are two different kinds of 
representational injustice: misrepresentation, which is a normal injustice occurring when the 
norms of representation within existing institutions fail, and misframing, an abnormal injustice 
arising when the boundaries drawn around our discussions and decisions about what justice 
requires are themselves in question. Misframing, then, is the core global injustice, as the 
changes wrought by globalisation have thrown the conventional Westphalian-Keynesian 
                                               
42 This reflects the wider tendency in the global justice literature noted above. Some, like Benhabib try to 
resolve the tension through cosmopolitan orders that attend to the diversity of responses to global injustices, see 
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43 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (Cambridge: Polity, 
2008). 
44 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1997). 
45 Fraser, Scales of Justice, 48–75. 
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framing into misalignment with social reality. Global justice, therefore, must first address the 
“who” of justice and the “how” of our determination of the “who”. As Paul Muldoon draws 
out, for Fraser  
 
the global poor can legitimately claim to be victims of a global economic 
system that distributes resources inequitably and a global status order that 
denies recognition to all but a select few. These economic and cultural 
injustices are, however, compounded by the fact that the global poor are 
denied the opportunity to challenge the social arrangements that prevent 
them from participating as peers in social life.46 
 
Like Forst, Fraser thinks that justice requires more than the redistribution of wealth or the 
securing basic rights, but she goes further, suggesting the Westphalian-Keynesian order that 
frames conventional accounts of justice needs to be rethought.  
 Having opened up the question of how political community is formed, Fraser than 
considers the meta-question of how we decide the proper boundaries of membership and forms 
of democratic procedure. At this point, Fraser relies upon the principle of participatory parity, 
suggesting that all those who are subjected47 to a regime of governance have the right to be 
involved in the democratic deliberation over the proper boundaries determining inclusion and 
exclusion within political community. The democratic determination of the proper frame of 
justice will be achieved by subjecting the informal discussion of such matters in global civil 
society to a formal institutional procedure that can give determinate shape to a new geography 
of justice. In the end, she does not give us a blueprint to what this new geography of justice 
will look like, though she suggests it should be self-correcting (avoiding the oscillation between 
“normal” and “abnormal” justice)48 and will require new transnational democratic power, 
which new institutions of global public opinion will hold accountable.49 Fraser more fully 
challenges the privilege of the theorist and also directly considers how we might reimagine the 
geography of injustice, thus surpassing Forst’s account. Yet, the seductions of the architectonic 
approach remain.  
 As Muldoon argues, the principle of participatory parity not only acts as a philosophical 
backstop that puts limits on how far actual democratic deliberation would be allowed to reframe 
questions of justice, it also presupposes the equality of individuals that grounds her wider 
project.50 Fraser is aware of the circularity to a degree, but Muldoon’s point cuts deeper, as he 
suggests that in presuming individual equality Fraser does not take adequate measure of how 
such equality is actually achieved. Drawing on Arendt, Muldoon argues political equality is 
the achievement rather than the grounding of democratic politics.51 Fraser maintains the 
visionary perspective of the architect but rejects the architect’s method of building from a 
blueprint. For this reason, not only is Fraser’s theoretical edifice unstable but it limits her sense 
of what democratic community requires, as she seems to suggest that further discussion through 
participatory institutions will lead to better arguments for reframing justice that will somehow 
enable us to confront the injustices of globalisation. What is missing is a consideration of how 
the power requisite to this programme for political change is actually built, especially 
                                               
46 Paul Muldoon, “The Injustice of Territoriality,” Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 15, no. 5 (2012): 636. 
47 Fraser embraces an “all subjected” rather than “all effected” principles for both logical and practical reasons, 
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48 Fraser, 72–73. 
49 Fraser, 99. 
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transnationally, given the global disparity of organisational resources, institutional 
infrastructure, and material wealth. Those holding power are likely to oppose a radical 
expansion of democratic power and the redrawing of political borders. Fraser has not entirely 
freed herself from the trappings of the architectonic approach, as she is trying to secure the just 
arrangement of already equal and democratic individuals by altering the boundaries of a world 
that is already a global political community. Fraser remains committed to a latent cosmopolitan 
ideal that does not fully predetermine the geography of injustice but does constrain our political 
imagination, such that her proposed reforms remain inadequate to the challenge presented by 
the inequalities of neoliberal globalisation.  
Fraser refuses to relinquish the architectonic urge to order the world, the sense that 
justice is realised through a perfected design of human life that the unruly world of actual 
experience can be made to resemble with sufficient insight and dedication. As Jodi Dean draws 
out, Fraser is concerned with how to deal with the incommensurability of justice claims brought 
on by the loss of the Westphalian-Keynesian frame, “confronting the specter of 
incommensurability entails articulating a unified, three-dimensional theory of justice, as if 
unity were necessary.”52 Like Forst, Fraser’s critical democratic method is limited in its critical 
and democratic character, as the link that they attempt to make to concrete contexts of injustice 
is mediated by the architectonic approach in which the universal, general, and egalitarian 
principles remain the privileged possession of the theorist, who in the end actually determines 
the substance of global justice. Given the limitation identified here, the task in the final section 
is to set out an alternative consummatory approach to global justice. In addition, a more specific 
situationist justice theory will be outlined.  
 
3. “From that place of darkness to a place of light.”53 
 
Plato’s allegory of the cave suggests the meaning of justice is found as we emerge from 
the darkness of everyday experience into the light of rational truth. In contrast, Edward Daffarn, 
a resident of Grenfell Tower, speaks of justice as the movement from darkness to light through 
political action that alters the conditions that create injustices. This contrast sums up the 
difference between the architectonic and the consummatory approaches. Seeking justice is not 
about discovering a rational model of society but rather altering relationships that have become 
destructive to those caught up in them. To return to fire as a political metaphor, first as 
authority, we see that injustice arises not because we lack the knowledge of how to order the 
world but because power relationships become harmful and exploitative—the fire of authority 
burns those it is meant to serve. The architectonic approach is not blind to concrete harms, but 
it seeks to remedy them by imagining a world in which those harms do not exist. A 
consummatory approach appreciates that human beings will always be entangled in social 
relationships, which will leave them vulnerable to being harmed and harming others. For this 
reason, at its core, the consummatory approach understands justice as the outcome of political 
struggles to alter social relationships that cause harm. Fire can also be the catalyst for change; 
in Daffarn’s words, “we need those lost lives to act as a catalyst for change” as we “move from 
that place of darkness to a place of light”.54 Justice, then, is concerned with identifying the 
conditions that give rise to destructive relationships and developing strategies for creating and 
maintaining the best possible relationships, as fire prevention is about controlling and 
managing fire rather than simply eradicating it. In what follows, I will develop these ideas in 
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two moves: first, by elaborating the consummatory approach through an engagement with the 
consequences of the Grenfell Tower fire, and, second, by outlining how the consummatory 
approach can be developed into a situationist global justice theory, drawing on the philosophy 
of John Dewey.  
Considering global justice in light of Grenfell Tower fire draws out the processual 
nature of injustice while also highlighting how a consummatory approach complicates justice 
theorising. Social relationships are increasing impersonal and institutionally mediated, 
allowing them to stretch across time and space. In turn, this means that the geography of 
injustice is neither linear nor territorially bound. This added complexity, however, makes for a 
more empirically adequate approach to justice. The surviving residents of Grenfell, and the 
wider community affected by the tragedy, demonstrate this processual nature of injustice in 
their understanding of what happened to them. Neglect by the tenant management organisation 
and disregard by the council are clearly identified as immediate causes of the unsafe conditions 
that allowed the fire to spread with deadly effect.55 In turn, these actions, and inactions, are 
understood as the practical expression of a process of managed neglect functional to wider 
processes of redevelopment and gentrification pursued at local, national, and global levels—
many residents claim these processes are more accurately identified as displacement or ethnic 
cleansing.56 The process of gentrification and the policy of managed neglect are in turn 
understood as rooted in a wider neoliberal ideology directing global capitalism in particularly 
harmful and destructive ways through dominant political ideas and institutions. Further, the 
specific experience of the victims is understood to result from the interaction of this assemblage 
of forces with cross-cutting structures of oppression, namely class, race, national identity, and 
gender, providing a comprehensive understanding of how and why the fire happened, as well 
as why the socially marginalised residents of Grenfell Tower were particularly vulnerable. A 
consummatory approach helps us to understand what happened at Grenfell Tower, but at the 
same time the experience of those in the tower, and their understanding of what happened, 
informs and develops the consummatory approach in turn. Understanding the Grenfell Tower 
fire as a global injustice helps us to see that global justice ought to be concerned not only with 
the overt actions of individual and institutional actors, but with the practices and institutions 
that constrain and mediate those actions, as well as the wider ideologies and social structures 
that shape practices and institutions. Even this cursory examination of the experience of those 
affected by the fire reveals the limitations of conventional global justice theory adopting an 
architectonic approach.  
Along with expanding and complicating the social relationships that the consummatory 
approach must be concerned with, the response of those affected by the fire also assists in 
rethinking the politics of justice and the geography of injustice. First, placing the fire in the 
context of contemporary urban development and neoliberal global capitalism already 
undermines the politics of dependency that characterised the architectonic approach, in which 
the wealthy and powerful must be motivated to save the poor and weak. The Grenfell Tower 
fire helps us to see that global injustice do not just happen, they are not accidents, nor do they 
only arise because of dysfunctional political orders, rather they emerge out of oppressive 
relationships, in which individuals are physically attacked and exposed to structural violence, 
exploited, marginalised, disempowered, or devalued.57 Further, these oppressive relationships 
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are functional to the prevailing political order, as they create social hierarchies that justify and 
preserve privileges for the powerful. Yet, because oppression is more than overt acts of harm, 
this also means that relationships can be oppressive without that being the express intention of 
the actors involved. At Grenfell Tower this played out with tragic consequences. At a very 
basic level, the fire was as destructive as it was because the building had been covered in 
inappropriate cladding, which proved dangerous when it was used incorrectly. The cheaper 
cladding was used because the safety and well-being of the residents of the tower was not 
valued by the tenant management organisation or the council, as the key concern was to 
appease wealthy neighbours who thought the tower was unattractive. The actors and 
institutions at work here were not intentionally seeking to oppress the residents, even as their 
actions and inactions clearly led to what one Grenfell survivor describes as “social murder”.58 
Injustice that arise from the operation of oppressive social structures are obscured if we 
understand justice through a politics of dependence. As Young draws out in her social-
connection model of responsibility, such injustices require a politics of resistance and 
struggle.59 
A consummatory approach sees justice as a struggle, which is reflected in the way those 
effected by the Grenfell fire understand their pursuit of justice and connect it to wider and older 
struggles against oppression.60 While assigning guilt and punishment is important for those 
individuals guilty of criminal acts, it is only one part of what justice requires. Justice as political 
struggle is fundamentally concerned with altering relationships, both immediate and those that 
are impersonal and institutionally mediated. We see both of these efforts in the aftermath of 
the Grenfell Tower fire. First, there has been an affirmation of community and an effort to 
empower that community, which involves caring for and enabling individuals, while also 
developing communal self-identity and greater powers of self-determination.61 Second, there 
is an effort to alter the community’s relationship to governing authorities, whether local, 
national, or global that involves understanding authorities as often complicit in oppression and, 
therefore, political change will require conflict and contestation over positions, resources, 
privileges, and other sources of power.62 Empowerment of the community is necessary to 
recognise the “silent and invisible violence” done to the community and made possible by the 
“quiet passage of unseen power”, which must be resisted by the community, as its own power 
is built.63 A consummatory approach to global justice, then, needs to look at the quality of 
global social relationships and the injustices they produce, while understanding the pursuit of 
justice as more than the proffering of ideals and justifications for legitimate power. Justice 
demands resistance and change, meaning that justice theory should be concerned with the 
justification and efficiency of resistance as well as working imaginatively and experimentally 
to imagine not only new ideals but concrete tactics and practices to assist in the remaking of 
the world.64  
The limitations of space mean that further reflection on the events at Grenfell Tower 
are not possible. Instead, in the space left I want to suggest a promising way forward in 
rethinking global justice from a consummatory perspective. The architectonic approach, with 
its precision and impartiality, has an inherent harshness when human experience is measured 
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against its exacting standards. A consummatory approach aspires to be a more humane 
approach, in which ideals of justice are not blueprints for an imagined world yet to come, but 
rather tools to be used in the struggle to overcome of injustice, engaging in the melioristic and 
necessary work of repairing relationships that harm us. Therefore, a consummatory approach 
focuses on the improvement of social relationships, transforming them from conflictual or 
harmful relations to those that are cooperative and positive.  
There will be, however, many ways in which this broad approach can be specified and 
developed. Here, I want to draw on John Dewey’s thinking on justice to outline and recommend 
the further development of a situationist global justice theory. First, a situationist theory 
involves not only a shift in focus from ideal orders to social relationships but also the 
privileging of the concrete and specific over the general and abstract. It is on this point that 
John Dewey’s understanding of justice is melioristic and radical.65 He begins with a scepticism 
of abstraction, affirming that the ‘formula summum jus summa injuria expresses the outcome 
when abstract law is insisted upon without reference to the needs of concrete cases,’66 but rather 
than try to find ways of mediating abstract and universal principles to concrete experience, 
Dewey abandons abstraction to affirm the primacy of the particular. He asserts that while 
general principles ‘may have a certain suggestiveness in connection with specific 
situations…the conceptions are not proffered for what they may be worth in connection with 
special historic phenomena. They are general answers supposed to have a universal meaning 
that covers and dominates all particulars.’67 In contrast to this, Dewey’s approach provides the 
basis for a radically situationist global justice theory, in which justice aims at the remaking of 
our specific relationships, while also understanding our judgments about what justice demands 
as specific to concrete moments of injustice. Our judgments on what justice requires do not 
provide us with regulative principles at all, as ‘every moral situation is a unique situation 
having its own irreplaceable good”.68 Justice is the virtue of social relationships that empower 
and cultivate but it must constantly be remade in a dynamic social process of inquiry and 
practical action. For Dewey, this work is best done through a radically democratic culture, 
which is the product of practical action not the consequence of an abstract obligation. 
 
Families, schools, local governments, the central government – all these must be 
reformed, but they must be reformed by the people who constitute them, working 
as individuals – in collaboration with other individuals, each accepting his own 
responsibility … Social progress is neither an accident or a miracle; it is the sum 
of efforts made by individuals...69 
 
Thus, a situationist global justice theory entails a distinctive approach to understanding how 
and why our social relationships need to be reconstructed. In this work, the theorist’s role is to 
contribute to an ongoing form of collective inquiry into real lived problems as an equal 
participant, which is a far less hierarchical and more democratic approach than conventional 
global justice theory. Further, the results of that collective inquiry are contingent as the process 
of pursuing justice is always incomplete and ongoing.  
 The second major difference of a situationist global justice theory is the attention to the 
nature of global injustice, which must be concrete and specific, informed by empirical inquiry. 
In part, this means that broad generalisations about failing states, deficient political cultures, 
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or even a dysfunctional Westphalian international order are inadequate. A situationist justice 
theory requires a scepticism of any general theoretical concept used to explain injustice, as 
such concepts are merely tools of inquiry, which must prove their value. Further, the idealised 
political geography that leaves us stuck between the nation-state and some cosmopolitan 
authority-to-come should be abandoned as it serves only to blunt critical inquiry into 
contemporary globalised injustices. Giving up this political imaginary also entails letting go of 
the geography of injustice in which there are privileged spaces of justice and order, occupied 
with distinctly capable and rational people with duties to save unfortunate individuals living in 
deprived spaces of injustice and disorder.  
 Giving up the conventional framings of global justice is disorienting, as Fraser notes, 
but that disorientation should be felt as a call to inquiry rather than a kind of moral vertigo 
requiring new, if more mediated, grounding. While it is understandable that rethinking our 
framing of global justice from the concrete and particular introduces both the confusion that 
accompanies novelty and a complexity that arises out of multiplicity, if global justice theory 
seeks to contribute to the amelioration of pressing human problems, then it must find its footing 
in the mire. The prescription of greater specificity and concreteness, however, should not be 
taken as an appeal to naïve empiricism, as we can and should make use of general notions in a 
hypothetical and experimental way. While this is only an initial opening, there are a number of 
hypothetical concepts that we can use to orient a situationist global justice theory. First, 
contemporary injustice is increasingly the result of social processes and relationships of global 
scope, which are both transnational and trans-local. Second, these global injustices occur in a 
complex social geography of overlapping institutions, social interactions of increasing speed 
and quantity, and mobile individuals and communities—making an easy determination of 
spaces of justice versus injustice impossible. Additionally, this requires thinking of justice in 
terms of unintended consequences of social structures and processes, such that a moral 
imaginary focused on the evil of individual or institutional perpetrators of injustice is 
inadequate.  Third, given the focus on injustices arising out of global social connections, a 
primary concern should be the persistence of domination and oppression in those relationships, 
especially as they attach to hierarchical social identities of global scope, such as race, gender, 
and class. Fourth, as a consequence of the persistence of domination and oppression, which 
creates exploitative and hierarchical relationships, inquiry into the nature and remedy of global 
injustice is best understood through engagement with the experiences of those suffering 
domination and oppression. This provides a situated standpoint for identifying pressing 
injustices while contributing to the democratic character of global justice theorising by 
undermining the theorist’s power to frame the nature of injustice while encouraging more 
collaborative forms of inquiry. Fifth, and finally, a situationist global justice theory should 
address itself to remaking inequitable social relationships in a radical way, pursuing the 
empowerment of oppressed individuals and communities as a precondition of just 
relationships. 
 This is an all too brief sketch, but even in this outline form a situationist global justice 
theory radically alters how we approach injustice in the contemporary world. By starting with 
immediate concrete problems and seeking to remedy those through practical action informed 
by theoretical reflection, a situationist theory offers a consummatory approach that privileges 
the lived experiences of injustice. Injustices mark out fissures in the surface of our experience. 
Along with these ruptures comes a desire to understand the causes, to become more aware of 
the problem, to fix it, to remake the painful experience—all of this is present in the discourse 
of the groups working for justice in the wake of the Grenfell fire. That desire to remake our 
experience is what motivates the practical action of pursuing justice, which involves remaking 
the conditions of experience so that previous harms are overcome, such as when the Grenfell 
victims speak of repairing, rebuilding, and recreating communal relationships. Further, a 
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situationist global justice theory combines it focus on lived experience with a commitment to 
a radically democratic politics, in which the experience of injustice generates a political 
demand for those harmed by a dysfunctional social order to have a say in the relationships, 
processes, and institutions that affect them. A situationist global justice theory requires us to 
consider how the distribution of power and privilege leads to injustice, and how its 
redistribution is necessary to the pursuit of justice. Finally, by refusing the idealisations that 
structure conventional global justice theory it reconfigures the geography of justice in two vital 
ways. First, we are not dealing with static national community or a universal global polity, but 
rather the emergence of community within complex global social spaces. This means we have 
to understand global justice not as an extension of the architectonic order of the philosopher on 
to the globe but rather as opening up a critical inquiry into the justice of our global 
relationships—the social processes that link us in cause and effect, but also the political and 
communal ties that we develop in order to pursue justice. A situationist global justice theory 
understands our condition as global but the goal of justice remains the remaking of lived 
experience, which is important work to be done by, and in partnership with, those experiencing 
injustice. Thus, the role of the theorist is more modest, demanding greater humility and an 
understanding that our general reflections can assist inquiry but that we remain students of the 
world with much to learn about the pursuit of justice as a concrete and collective endeavour. 
Global justice theory is needed, and begins, in our cities and towns, in connecting our everyday 
experiences to our wider global condition, and in fighting against injustice for ourselves and in 
solidarity with others. A situationist global justice theory, by embracing a consummatory 
approach, aims not to order the world but rather to contribute in some small way to its 
improvement as we work to move “from that place of darkness to a place of light.” 
